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Abstract
We consider 2-bidder rst-price auctions where one bidder's value
is commonly known. Such auctions induce an inecient allocation. We
show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the loser, increases (reduces) the ineciency
of the market when the buyer with the commonly known value is weak
(strong). Resale always reduces all bidders' payos and increases the
initial seller's revenue.
Keywords: asymmetric rst-price auctions, resale, eciency JEL: D44
1 Introduction
A worrisome property of sealed-bid rst-price auctions with asymmetric bid-
ders is that they can lead to an inecient allocation (Vickrey, 1961, Griesmer
et al, 1967, Plum 1992, Maskin and Riley, 2000). In such a situation, the
winning bidder might have an incentive to try to resell the good to a bidder
with a higher value. Rational bidders will anticipate the possibility of resale
and their bidding incentives will be dierent from the situation without a
resale opportunity. What then is the impact of a resale opportunity on ef-
ciency, seller revenue, and bidder payos? In particular, if the seller can
prohibit resale, should she do so?
This paper analyzes the impact of resale on rst-price auctions with
asymmetric bidders. We consider a class of 2-bidder environments that
1Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, 53113 Bonn,
Germany, and Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
93106-9210, U.S.A.. Email: troger@econ.ucsb.edu. I would like to thank Ted Bergstrom,
Davil Easley, Rod Garratt, an associate editor, and a referee for helpful suggestions.
1generalizes an example of Vickrey (1961). Buyer 1 has a private value for
the good on sale. Buyer 2 has a commonly known, positive, value. A typical
example would be the sale of an asset in the context of a market where buyer
2 is the incumbent rm who's value is known from previous interactions, and
buyer 1 is a potential entrant. We will put particular emphasis on two special
cases: a market where one buyer is known to be weak (i.e., where buyer 2's
value is close to 0), and a market where one buyer is known to be strong
(i.e., where buyer 2's value is close to the highest possible value of buyer 1).
As we will show, resale has dierent implications in markets with a weak
buyer compared to markets with a strong buyer.
The interaction is modelled as follows. A rst-price auction without
reserve price takes place. The winner either consumes the good right away or
oers it for resale via a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the auction loser. Because
the winner's resale oer is based on her posterior belief about the loser's
value, it makes a dierence whether or not the auction winner observes the
loser's bid. We assume that the loser's bid remains private, like in a Dutch
auction. We construct a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in this environment,
as well as an equilibrium when no resale opportunity exists.1 Neither with
nor without a resale opportunity, the equilibrium allocation is fully ecient,
so the question whether resale is good or bad for eciency is nontrivial.
Conventional wisdom would suggest that resale can only be good for
eciency because any resale transaction in itself realizes additional gains
from trade. Our results show, however, that if buyer 2 is weak the anticipa-
tion of resale distorts bidding in the auction so strongly that the post-resale
allocation is more inecient than the auction allocation when resale is not
possible. The reason resale is bad for eciency is that it strengthens the
weak buyer by giving her monopoly power in the resale market.2
When buyer 2 is strong, the eect of a resale opportunity on the ef-
ciency of the allocation is quite dierent. Without a resale opportunity,
the allocation remains far from ecient because the strong buyer lets her
opponent win too often in order to get the good cheaper. But if there is
a resale opportunity, the private-value buyer will successfully resell to the
strong buyer because she knows her value. Hence, the resale market cor-
rects most ineciencies that arise from the initial auction allocation when
a strong buyer is in the market.
We complete our analysis by showing that resale reduces the buyers'
1Both with and without resale, the equilibrium is essentially unique. We defer the
details concerning equilibrium uniqueness to a dierent paper, Tr oger (2004).
2If the buyers have, say, equal bargaining power in the resale market, the resale oppor-
tunity can still be detrimental to eciency, but the eect is weaker.
2payos and increases the seller's revenue. These results are driven by our
assumption of full bargaining power to the resale seller. The resale opportu-
nity strengthens the bidders' incentives to try to win the initial auction. The
intensied bidding competition in the auction shifts rents from the buyers
to the seller. Interestingly, the seller gains even when the resale opportunity
reduces the eciency of the allocation.
In summary, our results have the following implications. When one buyer
in the market is known to be weak and the seller is eciency-minded, resale
is a pure waste: it reduces all buyers' payos and at the same time makes
the market even more inecient than it is without resale. On the other
hand, resale increases the seller's revenue. When one buyer in the market is
known to be strong, resale still reduces the bidders' payos, but also makes
the market more ecient. In markets with a strong buyer, the seller should
allow resale both on eciency and on revenue grounds.
Previous studies of rst-price auctions with resale have mostly focussed
on the impact of a resale opportunity on seller revenue. Gupta and Lebrun
(1999) consider two asymmetric bidders with initially private values, but
assume common knowledge of values and ecient trade in the resale mar-
ket. Haile (1999, 2003) analyzes resale in symmetric environments where at
the time of the initial auction each bidder is uncertain about her own use
value.3 In both Haile's and Gupta and Lebrun's models, the resale oppor-
tunity increases the initial seller's revenue if the resale seller has sucient
bargaining power in the resale market. Hence, our result on the revenue of
the initial seller is consistent with their's.
A rst result on the impact of resale on the eciency of rst-price auc-
tions is derived in Krishna (2002, Ch. 4.4). He does not ask whether a resale
opportunity can be detrimental to eciency, but shows that a resale market
may fail to achieve an ecient allocation. Krishna considers two asymmetric
private-value bidders and a resale market where, as in our model, the auc-
tion winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the loser. In contrast to our
model, he assumes that both the winner's and the loser's bid become public
after the auction. Therefore, resale would restore eciency if the bidders
used strictly increasing bid functions. Krishna shows that the anticipation
of resale prevents bidders from using strictly increasing bid functions. Thus,
bidders retain some private information when they enter the resale market,
and this causes some ineciencies to prevail.
3In Haile's terminlogy, the term \use value" is used in the same way as our term
\value." His term \valuation" refers to the opportunity cost of not winning the initial
auction.
3A natural candidate for generalization of our results is an environment
with multiple symmetric private-value buyers and a buyer with a commonly
known value. Martinez (2002) constructs an equilibrium in such an environ-
ment without resale. Garratt and Tr oger (2004) allow resale and construct
an equilibrium in the case where the commonly known value equals 0; the
respective buyer is then called a speculator because she buys only in order
to sell. The main qualitative dierence between Garratt and Tr oger's equi-
librium and the resale equilibrium constructed here is that with multiple
private-value buyers, for many distributions of values the speculator will
not submit a positive bid at all. In these latter cases, the allocation will
be ecient, whether or not resale is possible. It is thus unclear whether a
resale opportunity is always detrimental to eciency in markets with multi-
ple private-value buyers and a commonly-known weak buyer. On the other
hand, the intuition behind our result that resale is good for eciency when
a commonly-known strong buyer is in the market suggests that the result
generalizes to the case of multiple private-value buyers.
Zheng (2002) constructs a seller-revenue maximizing mechanism with
asymmetric private-value buyers where the initial seller cannot prevent re-
sale. His results do not apply directly to our case of a private-value buyer
and a buyer with a commonly known value, but an optimal mechanism with
resale is easy to nd when buyer 1's value distribution has an increasing haz-
ard rate. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to buyer 2. The amount
of the oer is equal to the payo buyer 2 obtains from making an optimal
take-it-or-leave-it oer to buyer 1. This way, the revenue-maximizing Myer-
son (1981) allocation is implemented. Hence, being unable to prevent resale
does not harm a mechanism-designing seller if buyer 1's value distribution
has an increasing hazard rate.4
In Section 2 we establish the equilibrium conditions with and without
resale. In Section 3 we construct the equilibrium in the market without
resale. In Section 4 the equilibrium with resale is constructed. Section
5 analyzes the impact of resale on eciency, and Section 6 contains the
results about the impact of resale on buyer payos and seller revenue. The
Appendix contains proofs.
4Why do we assume that the seller uses a standard rst-price auction instead of de-
signing an optimal mechanism? Wilson (1987, p. 36-37) suggests that standard auction
mechanisms continue to be used because they are detail-free|the rules are independent of
the ne structure of the environment, like the probability distribution for a buyer's value.
But the mechanism-designing seller's optimal take-it-or-leave-it oer depends on buyer 1's
value distribution as well as buyer 2's value.
42 Model
We consider two risk-neutral buyers who are interested in consuming a single
indivisible good. The good is initially owned by a seller who has no value for
it. Buyer 1 has the random value ~ 1 2 [0;1] for the good. Buyer 2 has the
commonly known value 2 2 (0;1). Let F denote the distribution function
for ~ 1. We assume that F is continuous, F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1, and F has a
positive and continuous density on [0;1].
We consider a 2-period interaction. Before period 1, buyer 1 privately
learns the realization of her value, ~ 1 = 1. In period 1, the good is oered
via a sealed-bid rst-price auction without reserve price. The highest bidding
agent becomes the new owner of the good. To simplify the presentation we
assume that buyer 1 wins all ties. The agent who wins in period 1 either
consumes the good in period 1 or makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer in period 2;
if she fails to resell the good she consumes it in period 2. The buyers discount
payos that are obtained in period 2, according to a factor  2 (0;1).5
Actions taken in period 2 may depend on information that is revealed
during period 1. We assume that after period 1, the winner's bid becomes
public; the loser's bid remains private. This implies that that we consider a
rst-price auction as implemented via a Dutch auction. Such a descending
auction stops at the moment the highest bid is revealed, such that the losers'
stopping bids remain private. This assumption is needed for tractability, but
it is also common for real sellers to keep the losers' bids private in sealed-bid
rst-price auctions.
Buyer 1's bid function is denoted b1. A bidding strategy for buyer 2
is given by a random bid ~ b2 with distribution function H (we allow for
randomization because otherwise there is no equilibrium).
If buyer 1 wins in period 1, she oers the good for resale at price 2 if
1  2, and otherwise consumes the good. In both cases, buyer 2's payo
equals 0.
Now consider any bid b2 > 0 of buyer 2 that wins with positive proba-
bility. Upon winning with bid b2, buyer 2's posterior distribution ( j b2)
for buyer 1's value is given, for all 1 2 [0;1], by
(1 j b2) = Pr[~ 1  1 j b1(~ 1) < b2]: (1)
The posterior distribution ( j b2) is arbitrary if bid b2 wins with probability
0. The optimal take-it-or-leave-it oer of buyer 2 if she wins with bid b2 is
5The fact that we consider a 2-period interaction does not mean that the world is over
after two periods. We only assume that the resale oer includes a credible commitment




(1    (p j b2))p +  (p j b2)2; (2)
where  (p j b2) = limp0%p (p0 j b2) denotes the probability that the oer
p is not accepted. Buyer 2's expected resale payo equals
R(b2) = max
p2
(1    (p j b2))p +  (p j b2)2:
If buyer 2 wins with a bid b2 such that R(b2)  2, she oers the good for
resale; if R(b2) < 2, she consumes the good in the rst period.
Given buyer 2's bid distribution H, the expected payo of buyer 1 with
value 1 and bid b equals





Given buyer 1's bid function b1, the expected payo of buyer 2 with bid
b2  0 equals
u2(b2) = Pr[b1(~ 1) < b2](maxf2;R(b2)g   b2): (4)
A (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium outcome of the rst-price auction with re-
sale is a tuple (b1;H;T) such that (2), (5), and (6) hold.
81 2 [0;1] : b1(1) 2 argmax
b0
u1(b;1); (5)
Pr[~ b2 2 argmax
b0
u2(b)] = 1: (6)
We will compare the auction with resale with the auction where resale is not
possible. Without resale, given buyer 2's bid distribution H, the expected
payo of buyer 1 with value 1 and bid b equals
v1(b;1) = H(b)(1   b): (7)
Moreover, given buyer 1's bid function b1, the expected payo of buyer 2
with bid b2 equals
v2(b2) = Pr[b1(~ 1) < b2](2   b2): (8)
A (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of the rst-price auction without resale is a
pair (b1;H) such that
81 2 [0;1] : b1(1) 2 argmax
b0
v1(b;1); (9)
Pr[~ b2 2 argmax
b0
v2(b)] = 1: (10)
63 Equilibrium when resale is not possible
The rst step towards evaluating the impact of resale is to analyze the auc-
tion market where resale is not possible. The proposition below constructs
an equilibrium.6 Because there is no resale, the equilibrium bids are deter-
mined by the trade-o between payment amount and winning probability.





F(b)(2   b); (11)
b = max arg max
b2[0;2]
F(b)(2   b); and b = 2   V2: (12)
The rst-price auction without resale has an equilibrium (b1;H) with the
following properties. Buyer 1's bid function b1 is given by
b1(1) =
(
1; if 1  b;
2   V2
F(1); if 1  b: (13)







(b2 2 [b;b]); (14)
where  denotes the inverse of b1.
The proof is straightforward (for details see the Appendix). Buyer 1's
bid function b1 is such that buyer 2 obtains the payo V2 with any bid in
the range [b;b]. By (11), it is not protable for buyer 2 to deviate to a bid
below b. Because b = b1(1), a deviation to a bid above b is not protable
either. Buyer 2's bid distribution H is such that buyer 1's bid function is
optimal. Observe that H may have an atom at b.
We will assume that the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 repre-
sents the market outcome when no resale opportunity exists. It is therefore
important to know whether the equilibrium is unique. Tr oger (2004) proves
uniqueness under an assumption similar to, but not identical to, the re-
striction to weakly undominated strategies: we show that any equilibrium
6The equilibrium construction is similar to Vickrey (1961), who assumes that buyer 1's
value is uniformly distributed. A similar equilibrium construction also appears in Kaplan
and Zamir (2000), who construct an equilibrium for 2-bidder rst-price auctions where
the maximum value across bidders is commonly known.
7where buyer 1 does not bid strictly above her value is|up to bids of buyer-1
types that win with probability 0|identical to the equilibrium constructed
in Proposition 1.7 Without the assumption that buyer 1 does not bid above
her value, equilibrium uniqueness cannot be obtained: Tr oger (2004) shows
that there exist equilibria where the losing buyer-1 types bid above their
values and as a consequence all buyer-1 types as well as buyer 2 bid more
aggressively than in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.
Let us sketch the arguments leading to the result that the equilibrium is
unique if no buyer-1 type bids above her value. Let us assume for simplic-
ity that buyer 2's bid distribution is Lipschitz continuous, with a possible
exception at the lower end of its support, and that buyer 1's bid function is
strictly increasing and continuous (Tr oger, 2004, presents a proof without
simplifying assumptions). Let (b1;H) denote an arbitrary equilibrium. Let
 denote the inverse of b1. Let b and b denote the lower and upper end of
the support of H, and let V2 denote buyer 2's equilibrium payo. Because
nobody bids higher than necessary in order to win for sure, b = b1(1). This
implies the formula for b in (12). For all b2 2 [0;b], buyer 2's payo
v2(b2) = F((b2))(2   b2): (15)
Because no buyer-1 type bids above her value,
8b 2 [0;b] : (b)  b: (16)
Moreover,
(b) = b: (17)
(Suppose that (b) > b. Then all types 1 2 (b;(b)) bid less than b; these
types obtain payo 0, and any bid in (b;1) is a protable deviation.)
From (15) and (17),
V2 = F(b)(2   b):
Hence, for all b  b,
F(b)(2   b) = V2  v2(b)
(16)
 F(b)(2   b):
This implies (11).
7Only bids strictly below value are weakly undominated for any strictly positive type.
However, there exist examples of parameter constellations such that the unique equilibrium
has the property that a positive mass of buyer-1 types bid exactly their values (Tr oger,
2004).
8Observe that (b) > b for all b 2 (b;b] (if not, type 1 = (b) bids her
value, which results in 0 payo, but she can do better by bidding below her
value). Therefore,
V2  v2(b) > F(b)(2   b);
which conrms the formula for b in (12).
All buyer-2 bids in the range [b;b] yield the payo V2 (otherwise buyer
2's bid distribution would have a gap, which would lead to a contradiction).
Hence, (15) implies for all 1  b,
F(1)(2   b1(1)) = V2;
This implies (13) in the cases where 1  b. Types 1 < b win with prob-
ability 0, so their bids are not uniquely determined|they only have to be
aggressive enough so that buyer 2 has no incentive to submit a bid below b.
The bid distribution H is such that the bid function b1 becomes optimal
for buyer 1. Because H is dierentiable for Lebesgue-almost every b 2 (b;b),








= H0(b)((b)   b)   H(b) a.e. b 2 (b;b):
This dierential equation, with boundary condition H(b) = 1, has the unique
solution (14). This completes the equilibrium uniqueness proof.
The equilibrium allocation is inecient. Buyer 2 sometimes outbids
buyer-1 types above 2, and buyer 2 is sometimes outbid by a buyer-1 type
below 2. Therefore, if a resale opportunity arises, the buyers may try to
realize additional gains of trade. Rational bidders will, of course, antici-
pate a resale opportunity. In the next section we investigate how a resale
opportunity changes the bidding incentives in the auction.
4 Equilibrium when resale is possible
We now consider the auction market with a resale opportunity. The main
purpose of this section is to construct an equilibrium (Proposition 2). In
the subsequent sections we will compare the eciency and revenue proper-
ties of this equilibrium to the no-resale equilibrium outcome established in
Proposition 1.
In equilibrium, like in the no-resale equilibrium, buyer 2 randomizes her
bid over a certain interval, and buyer 1's bid function is strictly increasing.
9The bids are, however, dierent from the no-resale case because of the an-
ticipated resale payos. When buyer 2 wins with a bid equal to b1(1) for
some 1 2 [0;1], she faces the buyer-1 type pool [0;1) in the resale market,










if 1  2, and M(1) = 2 otherwise. Buyer 2 oers the good for resale if
and only if M(1)  2. To simplify the presentation of the equilibrium,
we assume that M(1)  2; i.e., we exclude discount factors so small that
buyer 2 never wants to oer the good for resale. Dene ^  by M(^ ) = 2.
Using this notation, we can now present the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume M(1)  2. Let
U2 = max
b2[2;2]
F(b)(2   b); (19)
b = max arg max
b2[2;2]
F(b)(2   b); and b = M(1)   U2: (20)
Then the rst-price auction with resale has an equilibrium outcome (b1;H;T)





K(1   2) + 2 if 1  2;
1 if 1 2 (2;b];
maxf2;M(1)g   U2
F(1) if 1 2 (b;1];
(21)
where K > 0 is any suciently small constant.
For all b 2 [b;b], let
m(b) = (b)   b   1bb1(^ )((b)   T(b)): (22)
where  denotes the inverse of b1.







(b2 2 [b;b]): (23)
If buyer 2 wins with a bid b 2 [b;b1(^ )), she consumes the good in the rst
period. If buyer 2 wins with a bid b 2 [b1(^ );b], she makes a resale oer
T(b) 2 (b)
def = arg max
p2[2;(b)]
(F((b))   F(p))p + F(p)2: (24)
10The details of the proof are in the Appendix. Because M is strictly
increasing and continuous, buyer 1's bid function b1 has the same properties
and its inverse  is well-dened. The bid function b1 is such that buyer 2
obtains the payo U2 with any bid in the range [b;b]. By (19), it is not
protable for buyer 2 to deviate to a bid in [2;b). When K is suciently
small, a buyer-2 deviation to a bid below 2 is not protable either. Buyer
2's bid distribution H is such that buyer 1's bid function is optimal (observe
that H may have an atom at b). Formula (24) for the resale oer function
T reects buyer 2's posterior belief that with bid b she wins against the
buyer-1 type pool [0;(b)).
In Tr oger (2004) we show that the equilibrium constructed in Proposition
2 is essentially unique under the assumption that no buyer-1 type bids higher
than the maximum of her value and the discounted buyer-2 value 2. This
assumption is in the spirit of iterated weak dominance. Buyer 2 will not
accept any resale oer above her value 2. Hence, when buyer 1 wins the
auction she cannot make more than 2 by reselling the good. Moreover,
the resale oer buyer 1 obtains when she loses is independent of her own
bid (recall that losing bids remain private). Therefore, no buyer-1 type
1 2 [0;1] has a positive reason to bid higher than maxf1;2g.8 Like
in the no-resale case, multiple equilibria exist if no restricting assumption
about buyer 1's bid function is made (see Tr oger, 2004).
Let us sketch the arguments leading to the result that the equilibrium is
essentially unique if no buyer-1 type bids higher than the maximum of her
value and 2. Let us assume for simplicity that buyer 2's bid distribution is
Lipschitz continuous, with a possible exception at the lower end of its sup-
port, and that buyer 1's bid function is strictly increasing and continuous
(the proof in Tr oger, 2004, does not make these simplifying assumptions).
Let (b1;H;T) denote an arbitrary equilibrium outcome. Let b and b de-
note the lower and upper end of the support of H, let U2 denote buyer 2's
equilibrium payo, and let  denote the inverse of b1.
Because nobody bids higher than necessary in order to win for sure,
b = b1(1). This, together with the assumption M(1)  2, implies the
formula for b in (20). Also by assumption, a buyer-2 bid b 2 (2;2] wins
at least against the buyer-1 types in [0;b). This yields a lower bound for
buyer 2's equilibrium payo,
U2  max
b2[2;2]
F(b)(2   b) > 0: (25)
8This iterated-weak-dominance argument also suggests that buyer 1 bids strictly below
maxf1;2g if 1 > 0, but for equilibrium-existence reasons analogous to the no-resale
case (see footnote 7) we do not adopt this restriction.
11Buyer 2's inmum bid, b, is not lower than the discounted buyer-2 value 2
(if it were, all buyer-1 types would overbid the lowest buyer-2 bid to get a
positive payo, but then buyer 2's equilibrium payo U2 = 0),
b  2: (26)
Like in the no-resale case, one shows that type b bids her value,
(b) = b: (27)
For all b2, buyer 2's payo
u2(b2) = F((b2))(maxf2;M((b2))g   b2): (28)
The support of buyer 2's bid distribution must begin below buyer 2's value,
b < 2: (29)
Suppose this were not so. Then buyer 2's lowest equilibrium bids are not
smaller than 2. Because U2 > 0, buyer 2 must be oering the good for resale
after winning with any of these bids. Because her resale payo must recover
her auction bid, her inmum equilibrium resale price must be higher than
b, and some buyer-1 types must be accepting this resale price. Hence, there
exists a buyer-1 type above the inmum equilibrium resale price who never
wins the auction but always waits for resale. For this type it is protable to
deviate by slightly overbidding buyer 2's inmum bid b, in order to get the
good cheaper|contradiction.9
Formula (27) together with continuity of  implies that any given buyer-
1 type above b wins against all buyer-2 bids suciently close to b. Hence,
(29) implies that all buyer-2 bids suciently close to b lose against all buyer-
1 types above 2. Therefore, buyer 2 consumes the good after winning with
any bid close to b. Thus, (27) together with (28) implies
U2 = F(b)(2   b):
This, together with (25), (26), and (29), shows (19). The proof of (20) is
analogous to the proof of (12) in the no-resale case (see p. 8).
All buyer-2 bids in the range [b;b] yield the payo U2 (otherwise buyer
2's bid distribution would have a gap, which would lead to a contradiction).
Hence, (28) implies for all 1  b,
F(1)(maxf2;M(1)g   b1(1)) = U2:
9The thrust of the argument is similar to the argument in Garratt and Tr oger (2004)
that shows that speculators make arbitrarily small bids, and thus cannot obtain positive
prots, in rst-price auctions with resale.
12This shows (21) in the cases where 1  b. Types 1 < b win with probability
0, so their bids are not uniquely determined.
The bid distribution H is such that the bid function b1 is optimal for
buyer 1. For all b 2 (b;b1(^ )), type 1 = (b) does not get a resale oer
if buyer 2 wins with a bid just above b; i.e., on the margin, type 1 does
not lose a resale opportunity. Therefore, for all b 2 (b;b1(^ )) where H is









= H0(b)((b)   b)   H(b) a.e. b 2 (b;b1(^ )): (30)
For all b 2 (b1(^ );b), type 1 = (b) loses the resale payo 1   T(b) on the
margin, with marginal probability H0(b). Therefore, her rst-order condition









a.e. b 2 (b1(^ );b)
= H0(b)((b)   b)   H(b)   H0(b)((b)   T(b)): (31)




a.e. b 2 (b;b):
This dierential equation, with boundary condition H(b) = 1, has the unique
solution (23).
The optimal-resale-price correspondence  dened in (24) is strictly in-
creasing (see the strict monotone comparative statics results of Edlin and
Shannon, 1998). Hence its set of points of multiple-valuedness is countable,
and the probability that buyer 2 makes a bid in this set equals 0. There-
fore, in the equilibrium range [b1(^ );b] the resale oer function T is uniquely
determined with probability 1. This completes the equilibrium uniqueness
proof.
The fact that resale payos are discounted is crucial for the equilibrium
uniqueness result. Without discounting, there exist equilibria where some
high buyer-1 types make lower bids than some intermediate buyer-1 types
(Tr oger, 2004). Discounting induces strictly increasing payo dierences
for buyer 1, which leads to a weakly increasing equilibrium bid function,
which is the basis of the equilibrium uniqueness proof. By strictly increasing
payo dierences we mean that buyer 1's payo dierence from switching
to a larger bid that wins the original auction with higher probability is
13strictly increasing in her type. Without discounting, a higher type does
not care more than a lower type whether she obtains the good today or
tomorrow. Thus, payo dierences are only weakly increasing, which makes
a nonmonotonous equilibrium bid function possible.
Like in the no-resale case, the equilibrium allocation of Proposition 2 is
inecient: it happens with positive probability that a buyer-1 type above 2
is outbid by buyer 2 and buyer 2's resale oer is so high that buyer 1 rejects
it. An important question now is whether the resale opportunity increases
or reduces the ineciency of the allocation.
5 The impact of resale on eciency
In this section we evaluate the impact of resale on the eciency of the
allocation. Apart from its general interest, such an evaluation is of direct
importance to government agencies who (i) are legally obligated to strive for
an ecient allocation when they act as sellers and (ii) are able to prevent
resale. In our model, preferences are quasi-linear. Hence, eciency only
depends on who consumes the good and when. The appropriate eciency
measure is the expectation of the discounted realized consumption value of
the good; this expectation is called the equilibrium surplus. The no-resale
equilibrium surplus is
Sno resale(2) = E[1b1(~ 1)~ b2
~ 1 + 1b1(~ 1)<~ b22];
where (b1;H) denotes the equilibrium from Proposition 1, and ~ b2 is an inde-
pendent random variable with distribution H. Observe that the equilibrium
surplus Sno resale(2) also depends on the value distribution F. We suppress
this dependence because we will present comparative statics with respect to
2 that are valid for all F.
With a resale opportunity, the equilibrium surplus is
Sresale(2;) = Pr[b1(~ 1) < ~ b2; R(~ b2) < 2]2
+ Pr[b1(~ 1) < ~ b2; R(~ b2)  2; ~ 1 < T(~ b2)]2
+E[1b1(~ 1)<~ b2; R(~ b2)2; ~ 1T(~ b2)
~ 1]
+ Pr[b1(~ 1)  ~ b2; ~ 1 < 2]2 + E[1b1(~ 1)~ b2;~ 12
~ 1];
where (b1;H;T) denotes the equilibrium outcome from Proposition 2, and
~ b2 is an independent random variable with distribution H.
In Proposition 3 we show that a resale opportunity can increase or reduce
the equilibrium surplus, depending on the parameters; i.e, resale can be good
14or bad for eciency. If buyer 2's value is large (i.e., close to the maximum
possible value of buyer 1) and the discount factor is close to 1, resale is good;
if buyer 2's value is small resale is bad.
Proposition 3 If  and 2 are suciently close to 1,
Sresale(2;) > Sno resale(2): (32)
If 2 is suciently close to 0,
Sresale(2;) < Sno resale(2): (33)
The basic ideas behind the proof|which is in the Appendix|are as follows.
Suppose that the discount factor is close to 1 and buyer 2's value is close to
1. If a buyer-1 type below the discounted buyer-2 value wins the auction,
she will make a take-it-or-leave-it oer equal to buyer 2's value if resale
is possible. Hence, whoever wins the auction the good will be eventually
allocated to buyer 2 with a high probability. Thus, the nal allocation is
approximately ecient if resale is possible. In the no-resale equilibrium,
buyer 2 lets buyer 1 obtains the good with a probability that stays bounded
away from 0 even if buyer 2's value approaches 1. Hence, without resale the
allocation is not approximately ecient if buyer 2's value is close to 1.
Now suppose buyer 2's value is small. Without resale, the auction is
approximately ecient for the following reason. Buyer 1 can win for sure
by bidding buyer 2's value; i.e., by submitting a small bid. Hence, the
equilibrium payo of every not-too-small buyer-1 type is close to her value,
and this means in equilibrium she must be winning the auction with high
probability. With a resale opportunity, buyer 2's auction winning probability
stays bounded away from 0 even if her value is arbitrarily close to 0 (if her
winning probability tended to 0, high buyer-1 types would make very small
bids, but then it would be protable for buyer 2 to overbid these high types
and oer the good for resale). But if buyer 2's auction winning probability
stays bounded away from 0, the same is true for the probability that she
eventually keeps the good because buyer 2 sets a monopoly price in the resale
market. Hence, with resale the allocation is not approximately ecient if
buyer 2's value is close to 0.
Proposition 3 provides a guideline for an eciency-minded seller. If she
knows there is a strong buyer in the market, she should not try to establish
a no-resale regime. But if she knows that a weak buyer is present, allowing
resale is harmful. Of course, we have obtained these results only in a specic
2-bidder model. In general, it may not be commonly known whether a weak
or a strong buyer is present, and matters can get more complicated.
156 The impact of resale on payos and revenue
This section completes our analysis with an investigation of the distribu-
tional impact of a resale opportunity.
In Proposition 4 we show that resale reduces both bidders' payos. For
buyer 1 this holds for any possible type, unless the type's no-resale payo
already equals 0, in which case her resale-equilibrium payo equals 0 as well.
For these results, we assume that the discount factor is suciently close to
1.
Proposition 4 For all 1 2 [0;1], let U1(1) and V1(1) denote the equilib-
rium payos with and without resale of buyer 1 with type 1. Let U2 and
V2 denote buyer 2's respective equilibrium payos. Then, if  is suciently
close to 1,
81 2 [0;1] : if U1(1) > 0 then V1(1) > U1(1); (34)
V2 > U2: (35)
The proof is in the Appendix and is based on the following ideas. In the
resale equilibrium only buyer-1 types above 2 can get a positive payo.
No such type will resell the good, and if she obtains the good, she pays
at least 2, whether she buys in the auction or in the resale market. But
without a resale opportunity she can win for sure with a bid b < 2 if  is
suciently close to 1. Hence, her payo is smaller in the resale equilibrium
compared to the no-resale equilibrium. As for buyer 2, without resale her
payo is positive because she can win by bidding below her value 2. With
resale, buyer 2 submits, with positive probability, bids arbitrarily close to
b 2 [2;2). Such bids win against no buyer-1 type above 2. Hence, with
resale buyer 2's payo tends to 0 as the discount factor tends to 1.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of a resale opportunity on the revenue
of the initial seller.
Proposition 5 If the discount factor is suciently close to 1, the seller's
expected revenue is larger in the resale equilibrium than in the no-resale
equilibrium.
To prove this, it suces to observe that the seller's no-resale revenue is
smaller than 2, while her revenue in the resale equilibrium is larger than
162. These lower and upper bounds are immediate from the equilibrium
constructions.10
Provided the discount factor is suciently close to 1, we can conclude
that the seller should certainly allow resale when one buyer is known to
be strong (i.e., 2 large) because then resale increases her revenue as well
as the eciency of the market. If one buyer is known to be weak (i.e., 2
small), a seller who considers prohibiting resale has to weigh her revenue
losses against the gains in eciency.
The seller could also try to increase her revenue by setting a reserve price,
but|in contrast to simply allowing resale|setting an eective reserve price
requires knowledge of the value distribution F and of 2. It is easy to see
that any given reserve price is revenue-decreasing for some (F;2) pair, but
allowing resale increases revenue for all (F;2) pairs. In the spirit of Wilson
(1987), allowing resale is (in the class of environments considered here) a
robust way of increasing revenue, while setting a revenue-increasing reserve
price requires knowledge of the market parameters.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Observe that b1(1) < 1 for all 1 > b, by denition
of b in (12). Hence, (b) > b for all b 2 (b;b]. This implies that H is
continuous and strictly increasing on (b;b]. Moreover, the limit H(b) =
limb&b H(b) exists. Hence, H is a distribution function.
Let us verify (10). We have to show that any bid b2 2 [b;b] is optimal.
By (13),
81  b : F(1)(2   b1(1)) = V2:
Hence,
8b2 2 [b;b] : v2(b2) = F((b2))(2   b2) = V2: (36)
For b2  b,
v2(b2)  (2   b)
(36)
= V2:
For b2  b,
v2(b2)
(13)
= F(b2)(2   b2)
(11)
 V2:
10Observe that a seller who's utility is increasing in her realized revenue should allow
resale independently of her risk attitudes if the discount factor is suciently close to 1.
Her realized revenue is less than 2 without resale, but larger than or equal to  in the
resale equilibrium.
17Let us now verify (9). For all types 1  b, no bid b  b yields a positive
payo, and any bid b > b leads to a negative payo.

















One sees that @v1=@b < 0 if 1 < (b), = if =, and > if <. Therefore, the bid
b1(1) is optimal for type 1 among all bids in the range (b;b). Because v1 is
continuous from the right at b, a deviation to the bid b = b is not protable;
similarly, a deviation to b = b is not protable. Any bid b < b leads to a
0 payo, and any bid b > b leads to the payo 1   b < 1   b = v1(b;1).
QED
Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1: b1 is strictly increasing and continuous on
[0;1], so that it has a continuous inverse .
Clearly, b1 is strictly increasing and continuous on [0;b]. By denition
of U2 and b, we have b = 2   U2=F(b), which shows continuity of b1 at
b. To prove that b1 is strictly increasing and continuous on [b;1], it is
sucient that M has these properties on [2;1]. Continuity of M follows
from Berge's Theorem of the Maximum. Strict monotonicity of M at 2 is
clear because M(2) = 2 < M(1) for any 1 > 2. To complete the proof
of strict monotonicity, consider any 00
1 > 0
1 > 2. Dene for all 1 > 2 and
p 2 [1;2],







Let p0 be a maximizer in (18) if 1 = 0
1, and let p00 be a maximizer in (18)
if 1 = 00







Step 2: buyer 2's posterior beliefs and resale decision.
For all b2  b such that buyer 2 wins with positive probability, and all
1 2 [0;(b2)], let




18Then condition (1) is satised, buyer 2's resale oer satises (24), and buyer
2's resale payo when she wins with bid b2 equals M((b2)). Hence, buyer
2 oers the good for resale if and only if she wins with a bid b2  b1(^ ).
Step 3:
81 > b : b1(1) < 1: (38)
If 1  2, the denitions of U2 and b imply F(1)(2   1) < U2, which
implies (38) by denition of b1. If 1 2 (2; ^ ], inequality (38) is immediate.
If 1 > ^ , inequality (38) follows from M(1) < 1.
Step 4:
8b0 > b 9 > 08b 2 (b0;b] : m(b)  : (39)




Hence, m(b)  (b)(1   )  ^ (1   )
def = m1 > 0.
For all b 2 [b0;b1(^ )), the continuity of  together with (38) implies that
m(b)  min
^ b2[b0;b1(^ )]
(^ b)  ^ b
def = m2 > 0:
Thus, (39) holds with  = minfm1;m2g if b0 < b1(^ ), and  = m1 if b0 
b1(^ ).
Step 5: H is a probability distribution function.
By (39), H is strictly increasing and continuous on (b;b], and the limit
H(b) = limb&b H(b) exists.
Step 6: proof of (6).
It is sucient to show the following:
8b2 2 [b;b] : u2(b2) = U2;
8b2 62 [b;b] : u2(b2)  U2;
If b2 2 [b;b1(^ )) then (b2) < ^ , hence M((b2)) < 2, hence
u2(b2) = F((b2))(2   b2)
(21)
= U2:
If b2 2 [2;b] then (b2) = b2 < ^  by (21). Hence,
u2(b2) = F(b2)(2   b2)
(19)
 U2:
19If K > 0 is chosen small enough,
8b2 < 2 : u2(b2)
(21)
< u2(2) = U2:
If b2 2 [b1(^ );b] then (b2)  ^ , hence
u2(b2) = F((b2))(M((b2))   b2)
(21)
= U2:
Step 7: proof of (5).
Consider rst buyer-1 types 1  b. For all b2 > 0, the resale oer
T(b2)  2 > b  1. Hence, type 1 never gets an acceptable resale oer.





Because H(b) = 0 for all b < b, any bid b < b is optimal for every type
1 < b, and the bid b = b is optimal for type 1 = b.
To show (5) for buyer-1 types 1 > b, observe rst that u1(b;1) <
u1(b;1) if b > b, and u1(b;1) = 0 if b < b. Therefore, it is sucient to
focus on the bidding range b 2 [b;b].
An application of strict monotone comparative statics (see Edlin and
Shannon, 1998) shows that T is strictly increasing on [b1(^ );b]. Let T =
T(b1(^ )) denote the minimum equilibrium resale price. The supremum win-
ning bid of buyer 2 that leads to an acceptable resale oer for type 1  T
is denoted
T 1(1) = supfb0  b j T(b0)  1g:
For all buyer-1 types 1  T,
u1(b;1) = H(b)(1   b):
For all buyer-1 types 1  T,




Let D denote the set of discontinuities of T in (b1(^ );b). Because T is strictly
increasing, D is countable. By the denitions of m and H, the function H





20Now consider 1 2 [T; ^ ]. For all b 2 (T 1(1);b) n D,
@u1
@b
(b;1) = H0(b)(1   b)   H(b)
(40)
= H0(b)(1   b   m(b))
b>b1(^ )
= H0(b)(1   (b)   (T(b)   (b)))
T(b)>1
 H0(b)(1   )(1   (b))
(b)>1
 0:
For all b 2 (b1(^ );T 1(1)) n D,
@u1
@b
(b;1) = H0(b)(1   b)   H(b)   (1   T(b))H0(b)
(40)
= H0(b)(1   b   (1   T(b))   m(b))
= H0(b)(1   )(1   (b))  0:





= H0(b)(1   b   m(b))
= H0(b)(1   (b))
 0 if b < b1(1);
 0 if b > b1(1):
In summary, for all 1 2 [T; ^ ] and all b 2 (b;b) n D,
if b < b1(1) :
@u1
@b
(b;1)  0; (41)
if b > b1(1) :
@u1
@b
(b;1)  0: (42)
For every b0 > b, (39) implies that the function H is Lipschitz continuous on
[b0;b]. Hence, u1(;1) is Lipschitz on [b0;b]. Hence, on the domain [b0;b] the
function u1(;1) can be written as the integral over its derivative. Hence,
the inequalities (41) and (42) show that for type 1 the bid b = b1(1) is
optimal in the range [b0;b]. A deviation to the bid b = b is not protable
because b0 is arbitrary and u1(;1) is continuous from the right at b.
Now consider types 1 2 (b;T). Arguments similar to those above show
that for type 1 the bid b = b1(1) is optimal in the range [b;b1(^ )]. For
21b 2 (b1(^ );b) n D,
@u1
@b
(b;1) = H0(b)(1   b)   H(b)
0def
=T(b)>1








which completes the optimality proof for types 1 2 (b;T).
Types 1 2 (b1(^ );1] are treated similarly to the cases that were already
discussed. QED
Proof of Proposition 3. It is sucient to show the following four things,
lim sup
2!1
Sno resale(2) < 1; (43)
lim
2!0
Sno resale(2) = E[~ 1]; (44)
lim
2!1; !1
Sresale(2;) = 1; (45)
lim sup
2!0
Sresale(2;) < E[~ 1]: (46)
Proof of (43). Observe that V2, b, b, , and H, as dened in Proposition 1,
are functions of 2 and . Berge's Theorem of the Maximum implies
lim
2!1













1 def = 1   V 1
2 :
Hence, b
1 = 1   F(b1)(1   b1) and thus b1 < b
1. Moreover, dening ^ b =
(b
1 + b1)=2, there exists  < 1 such that
82   : ^ b 2 (b;b) (47)
In the compact range
f(b;2) j 2 2 [;1]; b 2 [^ b;b]g;
22the continuous mapping (b;2) 7! (b)   b is strictly positive. Hence, there
exists a lower bound  > 0. Therefore,
lim inf
2!1
H(^ b)  e (b
1








Pr[b1(~ 1)  ~ b2]  lim inf
2!1
H(^ b)(1   F((^ b))) > 0:
This implies (43).
To prove (44), it is sucient to show that
lim
2!0
Pr[b1(~ 1)  ~ b2] = 1: (48)
Consider any  > 0. Fix any 1 > 0 with F(1) < . Note that
H(b1(1))1  v1(b1(1);1)  v1(b;1) = 1   b:
Hence,




If 2 is so small that H(b1(1)) > 1   ,
Pr[b1(~ 1)  ~ b2]  Pr[~ 1  1]Pr[b1(1)  ~ b2]  (1   )2:
This proves (48) because  is arbitrary.
As for (45), observe that T(~ b2)  2. Hence, Sresale(2;)  2.
To prove (46), observe that  > 2=M(1) if 2 is suciently small. Hence,




0 def =  max
p2[0;1]
(1   F(p))p > 0:
Dene ^ b = b
0=2. Then, because m(b)  1,














Pr[~ b2 > ^ b; ~ 1 2 (^ b=2;^ b)]  (1   e ^ b)(F(^ b)   F(^ b=2)) > 0:
Consider any 2 < ^ b=2. Suppose that ~ b2 > ^ b and ~ 1 2 (^ b=2;^ b). Then buyer
2 wins the auction because b1(~ 1)  ~ 1 < ~ b2. Moreover, T(~ b2) > ~ b2 > ~ 1
if R(~ b2)  2. Hence, buyer 2 consumes the good, which yields the value
2 or the discounted value 2, whereas the ecient allocation, to buyer 1,
would yield at least the value ^ b=2. This completes the proof. QED
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove (34), consider any 1 such that U1(1) > 0.
Then 1 > br  2, where br denotes the b dened in (20). By (21),
b1(1) > br  2. Also, T(~ b2)  2. Hence,
U1(1)  1   2; (49)
On the other hand,
V1(1)  v1(b
n;1) = 1   b
n; (50)
where b
n denotes the b dened in (12). If  is suciently close to 1, b
n < 2,
hence (50) implies
V1(1) > 1   2
(49)
 U1(1):
To prove (35), observe that V2 is given by (11), and U2 is given by (19). In
particular, V2 > 0 and lim!1 U2 = 0. Hence, V2 > U2 if  is suciently
close to 1. QED
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